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INTRODUCTION 
Should it be defamatory to falsely call someone a lawyer?  
Plenty of people hate lawyers (in the abstract, at least).  Hurling the 
false epithet “lawyer” could cause people to back away, to shun the 
individual, to walk in the other direction.  Real damage may be 
done by that single, erroneous characterization. 
Or consider for a moment what a member of Tony Soprano’s 
crew might lose if someone falsely accuses him of being a 
government informant.  Certainly, for the falsely accused here, a 
damaged reputation would be the least of his worries.  But as with 
the stigmatized “lawyer,” would the besmirched mafioso actually 
succeed in a defamation claim? 
Not likely.  While lawyers are loathed by some and stool 
pigeons reviled by others, in mainstream society neither draws 
general disapprobation.  Lawyer and tattletale jokes aside, the acts 
of lawyering and cooperating with police are not, to a reasonable 
person, shun-worthy. 
Why, then, do some courts continue to hold that a false 
statement that an individual is gay is defamatory?1  Even more, 
why do other courts still view this characterization as defamatory 
per se (i.e., the statement is defamatory on its face and damages are 
simply presumed)?2  What are the policy implications of these 
decisions on the direction of our society?  Is it fair to simply write 
off these rulings as homophobic? 
This Article will attempt to shed some light on the tangled 
combination of the descriptive and the normative bases on which 
courts find defamatory meaning.  It will first explore some of the 
intricacies of identifying defamatory statements in libel law, 
including the slander per se categories that have been imported into 
libel in many jurisdictions.  Next, this Article examines a range of 
cases in which the central question was whether a false statement 
 
 1 See Q-Tone Broad., Co. v. Musicradio of Md., No. 93C-09-021, 1994 Del. Super. 
LEXIS 453, at *14 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 1994) (citing Schomer v. Smidt, 170 Cal. 
Rptr. 662, 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)).  
 2 See Mangle v. City of New Orleans Dep’t of Police, 673 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(affirming lower court’s decision and holding that falsely calling someone gay was per se 
defamatory). 
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that the plaintiff was gay was defamatory.  These decisions present 
a wide range of opinions, with some recent cases questioning 
whether an allegation of homosexuality should ever be construed 
as defamatory.3  Finally, the Article analyzes the current state of 
the law and suggests an alternate approach to this important area of 
defamation doctrine.  We offer a proposal that suggests courts 
decline to find defamatory meaning not only in statements 
involving imputations of homosexuality, but in other statements 
concerning an immutable characteristic or involuntary state where 
a finding of defamation would tend to stigmatize or promote 
discrimination against that class of persons. 
I. IDENTIFYING DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS 
Proving defamation in United States courts has become an 
increasingly complicated undertaking.  Along with a substratum of 
common law requirements, the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed a 
number of additional layers of First Amendment firmament, 
beginning with the landmark case New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.4  Additional requirements flowing from state 
constitutional free speech and press protections have also made 
their way into the defamation laws of individual states. 
Although the basic elements of libel vary somewhat from state 
to state, a number of consistent patterns emerge.  The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts offers the following summary of the elements of 
 
 3 See Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Colo. App. 1991).  
 4 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the Court considered “the extent to which the 
constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to award damages in 
a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.” Id. at 
256.  At issue was a paid editorial advertisement, published by The New York Times, 
which contained several misstatements of fact regarding a civil rights protest in 
Montgomery, Alabama. Id.  Respondent, Sullivan, one of three elected commissioners of 
Montgomery, sued the Times, alleging that he had been libeled by the advertisement. Id.  
Reasoning that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be 
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space that they need . . . 
to survive,” id. at 271 (internal quotation marks omitted) the Court held that the First 
Amendment requires “a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering 
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that 
the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. at 279. 
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libel: “(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) 
an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at 
least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either 
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm, or the 
existence of special harm caused by the publication.”5 
The last element—the issue of special damages—deserves a 
brief discussion since it connects with an ongoing conflict in the 
law in cases involving imputations of homosexuality.  Most U.S. 
jurisdictions follow a rule that makes libel without special damages 
actionable only if its defamatory meaning is clear on the face of the 
statement—that is, “libel per se.”6  For statements without such 
patent defamatory meaning (“libel per quod”), the claim requires 
proof of special damages—actual economic or pecuniary loss.7  
These damages can be difficult to prove, and their absence creates 
a barrier to recovery.  A per se finding may also mean that “the 
plaintiff need not prove the statements were defamatory within the 
context in which they were made.”8  A further wrinkle is that a 
number of jurisdictions have now imported into libel law four 
categories of statements from the law of slander that also are 
actionable without special damages (drawn from the concept of 
slander per se, not to be confused with libel per se)9: (1) 
accusations of crimes; (2) imputation of a loathsome disease; (3) 
imputations affecting the plaintiff in his or her business or 
profession; and (4) imputations of unchastity.10  A number of cases 
involving sexual orientation have applied both the first and fourth 
categories to allegations that the plaintiff is gay. 
 
 5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). 
 6 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 2.8.3 (1999). 
 7 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1973).  
 8 Smith, 832 P.2d at 1024. 
 9 The per se/per quod damage distinction stems from the difference in the lasting 
effects of libel, which generally only requires proof of actual damages, versus the more 
fleeting nature of slander, treated as per quod and for which some jurisdictions require a 
showing of special damages. See Charles T. McCormick, The Measure of Damages for 
Defamation, 12 N.C. L. REV. 120, 121–22 (1934).  Some states have eliminated the 
distinction entirely, requiring all plaintiffs meeting the basic defamation elements to 
prove damages of some kind.  Moreover, these slander per se categories may be applied 
both in slander cases and in libel cases.  Courts sometimes confuse this issue by using the 
term “defamation per se,” but this does little to clarify which concept is being applied. 
 10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 570, 571–73 (1977). 
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Determining whether a statement is capable of defamatory 
meaning is generally the province of a judge in the first instance 
rather than that of a jury.  The standard by which this generally is 
done incorporates both descriptive and normative elements.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts states the majority rule that a 
“communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation 
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to 
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”11  In a 
comment to that section, the Restatement notes that the 
determination of the “community” in question is not based on the 
notion of a simple majority vote, but is instead determined by 
whether the communication would prejudice the person in the eyes 
of “a substantial and respectable minority” of the community.12  If 
only a small group of persons would view the statement as 
defamatory, the Restatement notes, that would be legally 
insufficient.  Moreover, “[t]he fact that a communication tends to 
prejudice another in the eyes of even a substantial group is not 
enough if the group is one whose standards are so anti-social that it 
is not proper for the courts to recognize them.”13 
Thus, the judge in a defamation case is required to determine 
how a “substantial and respectable minority” of the community 
would react to the statement in question, and whether that reaction 
would tend to harm the plaintiff.  As Professor Lyrissa Lidsky 
astutely noted, the nature of 
[t]he determination of who constitutes a substantial 
and respectable minority often hinges on what the 
judge presumes the community’s values are.  In 
effect, liability is often based on the judge’s own 
knowledge and experience rather than on the 
 
 11 Id. § 559. 
 12 Under defamation law, the “community” can be geographic, social, or even topical. 
See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 2008) (holding that a 
communication is defamatory if it prejudices the plaintiff in the eyes of a “substantial and 
respectable minority of the community”); see also Matthew D. Bunker & Charles D. 
Tobin, Pervasive Public Figure Status and Local or Topical Fame in Light of Evolving 
Media Audiences, 75 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 112 (1998) (arguing that the shift in 
media and audience fragmentation making it easier to reach more discrete communities 
warrants an expansion in the public figure doctrine). 
 13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). 
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community’s actual beliefs.  The “substantial and 
respectable minority” standard thus exemplifies 
what Professor Richard Hiers has termed a 
“cryptonormative” expression, that is, one that 
camouflages normative judgments beneath its 
“seemingly descriptive form.”14 
This normative grounding of defamation law suggests, of 
course, that as social norms evolve, formerly defamatory meanings 
may cease to be recognized as such.  Consider, for example, 
defamation by racial misidentification.  As Professor John C. 
Watson has described these cases, it was not uncommon for 
nineteenth and early twentieth century U.S. courts, particularly in 
the South, to find that falsely identifying a white plaintiff as 
African-American was defamatory.15  The earliest cases, Watson 
suggests, seem to have relied on either injury to the plaintiff in his 
business, or on “the loss of rights and the imposition of criminal 
penalties that black people were subject to solely because of their 
race.”16  This latter rationale tied the injury to the English common 
law’s per se category based on imputing a serious crime to the 
defamation plaintiff—in these cases, the crime simply was being 
black.  Later courts, Watson suggests, began to apply a community 
standards approach to defamatory meaning equivalent to the 
Restatement approach mentioned above, which resulted in an 
analysis of racial misidentification based on the expected reaction 
of whites to the individual misidentified.17 
Ultimately, courts began to reject defamation claims based on 
racial misidentification, acknowledging that while prejudices 
persisted among segments of the population, the community in 
general was now more enlightened.  In a 1989 case, Thomason v. 
Times-Journal, Inc.,18 a Georgia appellate court affirmed summary 
 
 14 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 19 (1996) (quoting Richard H. Hiers, Normative Analysis in Judicial 
Determination of Public Policy, 3 J.L. & RELIGION 77, 80 (1985)). 
 15 John C. Watson, Defamation by Racial Misidentification: A Study of the Social Tort, 
4 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2002); see also Jonathan D. Kahn, Controlling 
Identity: Plessy, Privacy, and Racial Defamation, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 759 (2005). 
 16 Watson, supra note 15, at 87.   
 17 Id. at 82, 84–85. 
 18 379 S.E.2d 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
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judgment for the publisher of a false obituary.19  Not only was the 
white subject of the obituary still alive, but the obituary stated that 
the memorial service had been held at a funeral home serving 
primarily African-American clients.20  The appellate court ruled 
that the law could not give its imprimatur to such a claim: “Private 
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, 
directly or indirectly, give them effect.”21  Moreover, the court 
wrote, “mere ‘peculiarities of taste found in eccentric groups 
cannot form the basis for a finding of libelous inferences.’”22 
A. False Imputation of Homosexuality Under State Defamation 
Law 
As previously noted, under current libel doctrine, state law 
resolves the question of whether the false imputation of 
homosexuality possesses a defamatory meaning.  The decisions 
generally fall into three groups, and while the growing trend is 
toward the acceptance of homosexuality in American society, 
defamation case law remains mixed.  Courts generally hold that: 
(1) such statements are defamatory per se, and damages are 
presumed, either because they imply a serious crime, unchastity, or 
simply expose a plaintiff to public hatred, contempt or ridicule;23 
(2) such statements are capable of defamatory meaning, but require 
proof of damages, a subset of which require proof of “special 
damages;”24 or (3) such statements are not capable of defamatory 
 
 19 Id. at 554. 
 20 Id. at 552–53. 
 21 Id. at 553 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). 
 22 Id. (quoting Fairley v. Peekskill Star Corp., 445 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (App. Div. 
1981)).  
 23 See, e.g., Burns v. Meyer, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (D. Nev. 2001) (“If the 
defamation tends to injure the plaintiff in his or her business or profession, it is deemed 
defamation per se, and damages will be presumed.”); Murphy v. Pizarrio, No. 94 Civ. 
0471(JFK), 1995 WL 565990, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1995) (“Under New York law . . 
. a published statement imputing homosexuality to another is still defamatory per se and 
proof of special damages is not required.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Smith v. Mission Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1303 (D. 
Kan. 2002) (“In Kansas, damages to reputation are not presumed and must be proved 
regardless of the type of libel or slander.”); Donovan v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d 572, 575 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (“Our courts have long recognized two actionable classes of oral 
defamation: slander per se and slander per quod: That is, the false remarks in themselves 
(per se) may form the basis of an action for damages, in which case both malice and 
C02_BUNKER_20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:41 PM 
588 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:581 
meaning at all due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas,25 as well as the increasing acceptance of 
homosexuality in contemporary society.26 
B. Defamation Per Se—Imputing (Former) Crime of Sodomy 
Under the traditional common law view, slander per se was 
limited to defamatory statements that impute to another person: (1) 
a criminal offense; (2) a loathsome disease; (3) conduct, 
characteristics or a condition that is incompatible with his business, 
trade or office; or (4) serious sexual misconduct.27  A number of 
cases, particularly those decided twenty or more years ago, have 
held that a statement that the plaintiff was gay fell within the 
“serious crime” category of slander per se.28  As noted earlier, in 
slander or libel cases in many jurisdictions, such a finding means 
that the claim is actionable without proof of special damages. 
For example, in Buck v. Savage,29 a 1959 Texas appellate court 
affirmed a libel and slander judgment on the per se ground of 
criminal conduct.30  The plaintiff, Eldon Savage, had been 
employed as a pharmaceutical salesman for Lincoln Laboratories 
and its president, Wallace A. Buck.  In the course of an 
employment dispute, Buck asserted that Savage was “‘queer’ on 
Hickam, meaning an unnatural relationship between two men.”31  
Other statements by Buck attacked Savage’s character and 
honesty.  The court held “words used in the case in issue were 
 
damage are, as a matter of law, presumed; or the false utterance may be such as to sustain 
an action only when causing some special damage (per quod), in which case both the 
malice and the special damage must be alleged and proved.” (quoting Beane v. Weiman 
Co., 168 S.E.2d 236, 237 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969))).  
 25 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see id. at 584 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“A State can of 
course assign certain consequences to a violation of its criminal law.  But the State cannot 
single out one identifiable class of citizens for punishment that does not apply to 
everyone else, with moral disapproval as the only asserted state interest for the law.”). 
 26 Lydia Saad, Americans’ Acceptance of Gay Relations Crosses 50% Threshold, 
GALLUP (May 25, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/135764/americans-acceptance-gay-
relations-crosses-threshold.aspx. 
 27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 570–74 (1977). 
 28 See, e.g., Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App. 1959). 
 29 323 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App. 1959). 
 30 Id. at 376–77. 
 31 Id. at 367. 
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slanderous per se because they did impute to [Savage] the 
commission of the crime of sodomy which was then a penal 
offense in Texas.”32 
Of course, in 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court dramatically 
altered the legal landscape of this “criminality” approach to slander 
per se with its decision in Lawrence v. Texas.33  In Lawrence, the 
Court struck down a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual 
activity and thereby overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,34 a 1986 case 
in which the court had upheld the constitutionality of laws 
criminalizing sodomy.35  Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
Lawrence majority, explained that the Georgia anti-sodomy statute 
violated the right to privacy under the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, declaring a fundamental right for 
consenting adults to engage in private sexual activity.36  Justice 
Kennedy championed the “liberty” interest in the Due Process 
clause, writing that the Court 
began its substantive discussion in Bowers as 
follows: “The issue presented is whether the Federal 
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence 
invalidates the laws of the many States that still 
 
 32 Id. at 369.  Other courts have applied defamation per se. See, e.g., Plumley v. 
Landmark Chevrolet, Inc., 122 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1997); Murphy v. Pizarrio, No. 94 Civ. 
0471(JFK), 1995 WL 565990 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1995); Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 
201 A.2d 344 (Md. 1964); Veazy v. Blair, 72 S.E.2d 481 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952); see also 
Thomas v. Bynum, No. 04-02-00036-CV, 2003 WL 553277 (Tex. App. Feb. 28, 2003); 
Nacinovich v. Tullet & Tokyo Forex, Inc., 685 N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1999); 
Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. 1984); Head v. Newton, 
596 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App. 1980); Mazart v. State, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 
1981); Nowark v. Maguire, 255 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 1964); Christy v. Stauffer 
Publ’ns, Inc., 437 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1969). 
 33 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  In 1962, a New York trial court somewhat 
presaged Lawrence when it suggested that a plaintiff’s allegation that he was labeled a 
“homosexual” did not constitute slander per se. Stein v. Trager, 232 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.).  The court reasoned that because the New York criminal code failed to 
disclose any specific crime in the phrase “homosexual,” the use of the phrase did not 
constitute words charging a punishable crime and were therefore not slanderous per se. 
Id. 
 34 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 35 See id. at 196.  
 36 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (citation omitted). 
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make such conduct illegal and have done so for a 
very long time.”  That statement, we now conclude, 
discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate the 
extent of the liberty at stake.  To say that the issue 
in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain 
sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put 
forward, just as it would demean a married couple 
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right 
to have sexual intercourse.37 
He further stated: “When sexuality finds overt expression in 
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one 
element in a personal bond that is more enduring.  The liberty 
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right 
to make this choice.”38 
Lawrence, which constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe has 
claimed “may well be remembered as the Brown v. Board of gay 
and lesbian America,”39 thus may be the death knell of the Buck 
approach.40  Indeed, as Justice O’Connor suggested in her 
Lawrence concurring opinion, the application of the Texas anti-
sodomy law as slander per se also improperly singles out 
homosexuals as a class “for disfavored legal status” in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause, which “neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.”41 
Yet, some post-Lawrence courts have still applied pre-
Lawrence precedent without relying on a criminal foundation.  In 
February 2010, a Texas federal court denied a radio station’s 
motion to dismiss allegations that it falsely branded the plaintiff as 
“Henry the gay security guard.”42  The court held that under Texas 
law, the “imputation of homosexuality might as a matter of fact 
 
 37 Id. at 566–67. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1894, 1895 (2004). 
 40 See Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363, 376–77 (Tex. App. 1959). 
 41 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 42 See Robinson v. Radio One, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 425, 426 (N.D. Tex. 2010). 
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expose a person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.”43 
Although the court recognized that Lawrence limited prior Texas 
defamation law, which, relying on the illegality of sodomy at the 
time had held allegations of homosexuality were defamatory per 
se, it avoided resolving the conflict.  Instead, the Texas court 
suggested that defamatory meaning was a question of fact and “a 
complex [issue], ripe for the clarification that comes from allowing 
litigation to proceed rather than the imposition of a single judge’s 
view.”44 
C. Defamation Per Se—Implying Unchastity or Exposing Plaintiff 
to Public Hatred, Contempt, or Ridicule 
While the continuing viability of the sodomy line of cases is 
questionable post-Lawrence, other courts continue to find the false 
imputation of homosexuality to be defamatory per se solely on the 
grounds that it either implies unchastity, or has the tendency to 
expose a person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. 
Typically, implied unchastity claims concerned suggestions of 
women having pre- or extra-marital sexual encounters with men.45  
However, courts have expanded the category to include allegations 
of female homosexual acts,46 and even suggested the theory could 
apply to male homosexual acts.47  For example, in Schomer v. 
Smidt,48 a 1980 California court upheld jury instructions charging 
that “lesbianism implies unchastity and abnormal sexual 
behavior.”49  In this case, the plaintiff, a flight attendant, alleged 
 
 43 See id. at 428. 
 44 Id. at 428 n.4. 
 45  See Bryson v. News Am. Publ’ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207 (Ill. 1996); Tonsmeire v. 
Tonsmeire, 199 So. 2d 645, 648 (Ala. 1967); Webb v. Isensee, 166 P. 544 (Or. 1917). 
 46 See, e.g., Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa per Azioni, 585 F. Supp. 2d 
520, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 201 A.2d 344 (Md. 1964); see 
also Rejent v. Liberation Publ’ns, 611 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (App. Div. 1994); Palmisano v. 
Modernismo Publ’ns, Ltd., 470 N.Y.S.2d 196 (App. Div. 1993); Guccione v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., No. 80AP-375, 1981 WL 3516 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 8, 1981). 
 47 Gallo, 585 F. Supp. 2d 549 (“[I]mputation of homosexuality can—at least when 
directed to a man married to a woman—be deemed every bit as offensive as imputing 
unchastity to a woman.”).  
 48 170 Cal. Rptr. 662 (Ct. App. 1980), disapproved on other grounds by Miller v. 
Nestande, 237 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Ct. App. 1987). 
 49 Schomer, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 664.   
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that a pilot had told others he saw her engaging in sexual relations 
with another woman.50  The court, while noting that sexual conduct 
between consenting adults was legal in California, nonetheless 
stated that “despite the sexual revolution and the freedom of action 
and expression now extant, there is a distinction which must be 
drawn between proper, moral and legal conduct,” such that “a 
homosexual or heterosexual act could be proper, legal, and 
questionably ‘moral.’”51  Thus, an imputation of “want of chastity” 
the court found, could cause others to think less of the plaintiff and 
subject the plaintiff to serious reputational harm.52  As a result, the 
court concluded that the statement was slanderous per se.53  
However, noting the changing perceptions toward chastity in 
contemporary society, a commentator in a leading defamation 
treatise added that: “Many adult American women might well 
consider it more harmful to be called ‘unchased’ than ‘unchaste,’ 
the common law to the contrary notwithstanding.”54 
Meanwhile, other courts hold that a false imputation of 
homosexuality as defamatory per se tends to expose a person to 
public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.55  Indeed, many New York 
 
 50 Id. at 663. 
 51 Id. at 666. 
 52 Id. 
53  Id. 
 54 SACK, supra note 6, § 2.4.4. 
 55 Manale v. City of New Orleans, Dep’t of Police, 673 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1982); 
Thomas v. BET Sound-Stage Restaurant/Brettco, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 448, 457 (D. Md. 
1999) (holding that all elements of defamation under Maryland law met when falsely 
calling woman a lesbian); Switzer v. Rivera, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1110 (D. Nev. 2001) 
(holding that the statements at issue were defamatory per se to the extent that they were 
made in the workplace, but granting summary judgment to defendants for plaintiff’s 
failure to prove defamation occurred); see also Klepetko v. Reisman, 839 N.Y.S.2d 101, 
102–03 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2007); Niconovich v. Tullet & Tokyo Forex, 685 N.Y.S.2d 
17 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999); Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg., Co., 411 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1987) (holding that employees of defendant company defamed plaintiff by falsely 
stating or implying he was a homosexual); Q-Tone Broad., Co. v. Musicradio of Md., No. 
93C-09-021, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 453, at *23 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 1994) 
(holding that while the imputation of homosexuality alone is insufficient to support an 
action for slander per se, comments which suggested that the plaintiff was a homosexual 
who propositioned his male clients maligned the plaintiff’s professional conduct and 
were therefore sufficient to support the plaintiff’s prima facie case of slander per se). 
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courts have traditionally followed this theory.56  For example, a 
New York appellate court ruled in 1984 that statements by a 
singing group about a husband and wife were libelous on their 
face.  In Matherson v. Marchello,57 a singing group, in a broadcast 
interview, suggested that both the husband and wife engaged in 
same-sex relationships outside of their marriage.  As to a comment 
by the singing group about the husband’s “boyfriend,” the court 
rejected the defendant’s argument that no social stigma should 
attach.58  “It cannot be said that social opprobrium of 
homosexuality does not remain with us today,” the court wrote.59  
“Rightly or wrongly, many individuals still view homosexuality as 
immoral . . . . In short, despite the fact that an increasing number of 
homosexuals are publicly expressing satisfaction and even pride in 
their status, the potential and probable harm of a false charge of 
homosexuality, in terms of social and economic impact, cannot be 
ignored.”60 
More recently, in the 2008 case of Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee 
Aeree Italiane-Societa per Azioni,61 a New York federal court 
found slander per se where the defendant told the plaintiff’s wife 
that the plaintiff was a homosexual and had had an affair with 
another male employee.62  The court reasoned that, under New 
York law, slander per se applied “because certain people view 
homosexuality as particularly reprehensible and immoral 
 
 56 While New York’s highest court has never weighed in on the issue, numerous trial 
and intermediate appellate courts have found the imputation of homosexuality to be 
defamatory or slanderous per se under New York law. See, e.g., Moye v. Gary, 595 F. 
Supp. 738, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Some New York courts have held that words 
constitute slander per se if they impute homosexual behavior.”); Tourge v. City of 
Albany, 727 N.Y.S.2d 753 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Privitera v. Town of Phelps, 435 
N.Y.S.2d 402 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), abrogated on other grounds by Liberman v. 
Gelstein, 605 N.E.2d 344 (N.Y. 1992); Nowark v. Maguire, 255 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1964). But see Stein v. Trager, 232 N.Y.S.2d 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) 
(holding that an alleged statement by the defendant that the plaintiff was a homosexual 
was not slanderous per se, since it did not charge the plaintiff with a punishable crime). 
 57 473 N.Y.S.2d 998 (App. Div. 1984). 
 58 Id. at 1005. 
 59 Id.  
 60 Id.  
 61 585 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 62 Id. at 551. 
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conduct.”63  While the court recognized that “many in our society 
no longer hold such beliefs, and that gay and lesbian persons have 
achieved many civil rights that were once denied them due to their 
status,” the decision was “based on the fact that the prejudice gays 
and lesbians experience is real and sufficiently widespread so that 
it would be premature to declare victory.”64  Yet, in reaching its 
decision, the court noted that “if the degree of this widespread 
prejudice disappears, this Court welcomes the red flag that will 
attach to this decision.”65 
D. Capable of Defamatory Meaning, Requiring Proof of Damages 
The vast majority of recent decisions have found that the 
imputation of homosexuality is not per se defamatory, yet that it 
does meet the basic defamatory threshold—a tendency to lower the 
plaintiff in the eyes of his or her community—thereby requiring 
the plaintiff to prove that the false statement caused damage.66  The 
degree to which a plaintiff must prove damage varies, with some 
courts requiring him or her to show as little as loss of social 
standing or reputation, and others requiring proof of economic 
damages.67  For example, one court allowed a plaintiff to cite as 
 
 63 Id. at 549. 
 64 Id. at 549–50.  
 65 Id. at 550. 
 66 See, e.g., Greenly v. Sara Lee Corp., No. CIV. S-06-1775(WBS)(EFB), 2008 WL 
1925230, at *8 n.15 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2008); Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 
(D. Conn. 2008); Smith v. Mission Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (D. Kan. 
2002); Regehr v. Sonopress, Inc., No. 2:99CV690K, 2000 WL 33710902, at *4 (D. Utah 
Apr. 14, 2000); Thomas v. Bet Sound-Stage Restaurant/BrettCo, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 448 
(D. Md. 1999); see also Gray v. Press Commc’n, LLC, 775 A.2d 678 (N.J. App. Div. 
2001); Stokes v. Meimaris, 675 N.E.2d 1289 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Donovan v. Fiumara, 
442 S.E.2d 524 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1023–25 (Colo. 
App. 1991); Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg. Co., 411 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. App. 1987); Moricoli 
v. Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Anson v. Paxson Commc’n Corp., 736 
So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Boehm v. Am. Bankers Ins. Grp., Inc., 557 
So. 2d 91, 94 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 
S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); Miskovsky v. Tulsa Tribune Co., 678 P.2d 242 (Okla. 
1983); Key v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 598 N.E.2d 207 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1990); Trice 
v. Burress, 137 P.3d 1253, 1257 n.7 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); Morrissette v. Beatte, 17 
A.2d 464 (R.I. 1941). 
 67 Compare with Hayes, 832 P.2d at 1024–25 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (suggesting that injury is not limited to monetary loss, but can be 
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damage the fact that a same-sex co-worker propositioned him in 
response to false statements about his sexuality.68  In another case, 
a plaintiff met her burden of proving damages by testifying that 
she experienced embarrassment and humiliation when her ex-
husband falsely told her colleagues that she was having a lesbian 
relationship.69 
A much-cited 1991 Colorado appellate case declined to hold 
that statements regarding homosexuality were within the per se 
categories.70  In Hayes v. Smith,71 two individuals told a teacher’s 
supervisor that she was homosexual.72  In concluding that the 
statement should not be classified as slander per se, the court noted 
several important factors, including the fact that proof of economic 
and reputational damage was less daunting than in earlier times 
due to the availability of expert testimony from economists, 
psychologists, and other experts. 
The court also distinguished between statements about 
homosexuality and statements about other standard per se 
activities, noting that: 
if a person is falsely accused of belonging to a 
category of persons considered deserving of social 
[condemnation], i.e., thief, murderer, prostitute, etc., 
it is generally the court’s determination as to 
whether such accusation is considered slander per 
se so that damages are presumed.  A court should 
not classify homosexuals with those miscreants who 
have engaged in actions that deserve the reprobation 
or scorn which is implicitly a part of the 
slander/libel per se classifications.73 
 
shown by emotional and reputational damage as well)) with Glazer v. Lamkin, 506 
N.W.2d 570, 572–73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).  
 68 Smith v. Mission Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1304 (D. Kan. 2002). 
 69 Stokes v. Meimaris, 675 N.E.2d 1289, 1295 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
 70 Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Colo. App. 1991). 
 71 832 P.2d 1022 (Colo. App. 1991). 
 72 Id. at 1023. 
 73 Id. at 1025 (citation omitted).  
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The court further noted that social attitudes toward gays were 
mixed and that no evidence in the case suggested “homosexuals 
are held by society in such poor esteem.”74 
Still other courts considering imputations of homosexuality 
require a heightened showing of damages, such that a plaintiff 
must prove “special damages,” i.e., proof of economic harm 
separate from emotional distress.75  In 1994, the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals, in Donovan v. Fiumara,76 held that referring to 
two women as “gay and bisexual” was not slander absent proof of 
special damages.77  The court reasoned that being homosexual 
itself was not a crime, and therefore was not per se slanderous 
because the conduct proscribed by state law making “a crime 
against nature, with mankind or beast” a felony was not necessarily 
implicated by the terms “gay” or “lesbian.”78  Indeed, the court 
added, homosexuality or bisexuality does not necessarily connote 
sexual activity at all, but rather an “inclination” or “preference.”79 
II. CHANGING PERCEPTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
After the Supreme Court’s groundbreaking decision in 
Lawrence, and in light of the changing attitudes in society towards 
homosexuality, a growing number of federal courts have adopted 
the rationale that the false imputation of homosexuality can be 
defamatory is no longer sustainable.80  To a certain extent, the 
 
74   Id. But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996) (striking down 
Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution, which “prohibit[ed] all legislative, 
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect . 
. . homosexual persons” as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution). 
 75 See, e.g., Miskovsky v. Tulsa Tribune Co., 678 P.2d 242 (Okla. 1983); Trice v. 
Burress, 137 P.3d 1253, 1257 n.7 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); Wilson v. Harvey, 842 N.E.2d 
83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); Donovan v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); 
Hayes 832 P.2d at 1022; Moricoli v. Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d 74, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977). 
 76 442 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994). 
 77 Id. at 576. 
 78 Id.  
 79 Id.  
 80 Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Amrak 
Prods., Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Murphy v. Millennium 
Radio Grp., LLC, Civil Action No. 08-1743(JAP), 2010 WL 1372408, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 
31, 2010); Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 273–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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Lawrence decision was presaged by some defamation courts.  In a 
pre-Lawrence decision out of the Southern District of New York, 
in a case without an allegation of homosexuality, the court 
discussed the common law per se categories and suggested, sua 
sponte, that under New York law, the defamatory implication of 
homosexuality “in twenty-first century Manhattan amounts to little 
more than an historical oddity.”81  Indeed, a few years later, the 
same court noted in dicta that the “welcome shifts in social 
perceptions of homosexuality” call into question the entire line of 
New York precedent holding the imputation of homosexuality is 
per se defamatory.82 
Taking a more direct approach, in 2004, a Massachusetts 
federal district court, applying Massachusetts law, questioned 
whether a false statement that an individual is gay is capable of a 
defamatory meaning, although the discussion is arguably dicta.  In 
Albright v. Morton,83 the plaintiff complained that his 
miscaptioned photograph in a book about the singer Madonna 
created the erroneous impression that he was gay.  Although it 
ruled that the photograph and accompanying text did not actually 
suggest that the plaintiff was gay—and thus was not defamatory—
the court nevertheless chose to address the question of whether an 
actual false statement that an individual is gay could be 
defamatory, at least using the per se approach. 
“Looking at any ‘considerable and respectable class of the 
community’ in this day and age,” the court wrote, “I cannot 
conclude that identifying someone as a homosexual discredits him, 
that the statement fits within the category of defamation per se.”84  
The Albright court reasoned that per se allegations of 
homosexuality, like the sodomy statutes overturned in Lawrence, 
“demean[] the lives of homosexual persons” and so too, the court 
 
 81 Dellefave v. Access Temporaries, Inc., No. 99 CIV. 6098(RWS), 2001 WL 25745 at 
*4, n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 10, 2001). 
 82 Lewittes v. Cohen, No. 03 Civ. 189(CSH), 2004 WL 1171261, at *3 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 26, 2004) (disposing case on statute of limitations issue).  
 83 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 84 Id. at 136. 
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reasoned, did application of the per se rule to allegations of 
homosexuality.85 
The court acknowledged that bias against gay individuals 
persists, sometimes driven by religious or ethical convictions, but 
wrote that “[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, 
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”86  The 
court noted that if it “were to agree that calling someone a 
homosexual is defamatory per se—it would, in effect, validate that 
sentiment and legitimize relegating homosexuals to second-class 
status.”87  The court’s opinion also referred to the racial 
misidentification cases and drew an analogy between those cases 
and Albright.88  In 2005, the First Circuit affirmed the opinion in 
Albright on the grounds that the photograph failed to impute 
homosexuality, and declined further opinion as to whether such 
imputation constitutes defamation in Massachusetts.89 
Following the logic of Albright, in a 2009 case, Stern v. 
Cosby,90 the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York rejected plaintiff Howard K. Stern’s claim, and a 
long line of New York precedent, that being called gay was 
defamatory per se under New York law.91  Stern, a former 
companion of the late celebrity-socialite Anna Nicole Smith, 
claimed that he was defamed by passages in a book written by 
television host Rita Cosby.  The book suggested that Stern had oral 
sex with a man at a party, and also that he and others watched 
pornographic videos of himself having sex with other men.92  Stern 
argued that the statements were defamatory per se under New York 
law because they exposed him to public hatred and ridicule.93 
 
 85 Id. at 137 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003)); see also Greenly v. 
Sara Lee Corp., No. CIV. S-06-1775(WBS)(EFB), 2008 WL 1925230, at *8 (E.D. Cal. 
Apr. 30, 2008) (holding that characterizing the imputation of homosexuality as slander 
per se demeans the lives of homosexual persons).  
 86 Albright, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 446 U.S. 429, 433 
(1984)). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 138–39. 
 89 Amrak Prods., Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2005). 
90  645 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 91 Id. at 273, 276. 
 92 Id. at 267, 281 (alleging other defamatory statements unrelated to Stern’s sexuality). 
 93 Id. at 273. 
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Rejecting Stern’s arguments, Judge Denny Chin noted that “the 
past few decades have seen a veritable sea change in social 
attitudes about homosexuality.”94  The court echoed the growing 
sentiment that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence had 
“foreclosed such reliance” on older, per se precedent.95  The court 
added that “in 2009, the ‘current of contemporary public opinion’ 
does not support the notion that New Yorkers view gays and 
lesbians as shameful or odious.”96  As evidence, the court pointed 
to the movement in the state to legalize gay marriage and to a 2009 
New York public opinion poll in which the majority 
overwhelmingly supported some form of government recognition 
of same-sex relationships.97  Moreover, the court relied on the New 
York Court of Appeals’ recent ruling holding that the right of gay 
marriage was not implicitly found in the state constitution, but that 
the legislature was not foreclosed to establish it.98  The Stern court 
pointed to the plurality opinion of New York’s highest court 
finding that social attitudes towards gay and lesbian New Yorkers 
had changed dramatically over the years.99  Finally, the Stern court 
reasoned that because the New York Court of Appeals had never 
ruled on the issue, it was not bound by the older line of cases that 
conclusively held that imputation of homosexuality was 
defamation per se; yet the court declined to either discuss the issue 
in depth or contemplate the “evolving social attitudes regarding 
homosexuality.”100  Judge Chin concluded that “[w]hile I certainly 
agree that gays and lesbians continue to face prejudice, I 
respectfully disagree that the existence of this continued prejudice 
leads to the conclusion that there is a widespread view of gays and 
lesbians as contemptible and disgraceful.  Moreover, the fact of 
such prejudice on the part of some does not warrant a judicial 
 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 274. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id.  
 98 Id. (citing Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he idea that 
same-sex marriage is even possible is a relatively new one.”)). 
 99 Id. at 273–74.  
 100 Id. at 275. 
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holding that gays and lesbians, merely because of their sexual 
orientation, belong in the same class as criminals.”101 
Recently, in the 2010 case of Murphy v. Millennium Radio 
Group LLC,102 a New Jersey federal court also found that “the 
assertion that someone is homosexual is not defamatory.”103  
Murphy was hired to take photographs of two male radio shock-
jocks for the cover of a magazine that depicted the men posing 
nude behind their radio station’s logo.104  The station encouraged 
listeners to submit digitally manipulated versions of the photo, and 
Murphy in turn accused the station of encouraging copyright 
infringement.  In response, the radio hosts made on-air statements 
about Murphy’s business practices, as well as allegations that they 
“inferred [he] was a homosexual.”105 
While the court found the statements were rhetorical hyperbole 
and did not convey a defamatory meaning, the court also held that 
to the extent the statements implied that Murphy was homosexual, 
they were not reasonably susceptible to defamatory meaning.106  In 
support, the court cited a 2006 New Jersey Supreme Court case 
finding an equal protection violation by the state’s denial of rights 
and benefits to committed same-sex couples that were given to 
their heterosexual counterparts.107  Following that decision’s 
reasoning, the Murphy court embraced the notion that “[t]imes and 
attitudes have changed, and there has been a developing 
understanding that discrimination against gays and lesbians is no 
longer acceptable in this State,” and noted that New Jersey had 
recently legally recognized same-sex domestic partnerships.108  
 
 101 Id.  While holding that the statements were not defamatory per se, the court 
nonetheless held that they were susceptible of defamatory meaning—but not because the 
statement alleged that Stern was gay.  Rather, the court reasoned that a “reasonable jury 
could find that engaging in oral sex at a party is shameful or contemptible,” regardless of 
the sex of the other individual, and that making a sex tape with any individual “would 
expose Stern to contempt among most people—even if, arguably, not among the social 
circles in which he . . . traveled.” Id. 
 102 Civil Action No. 08-1743(JAP), 2010 WL 1372408 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2010). 
 103 Id. at *7. 
 104 Id. at *1. 
 105 Id. at *2. 
 106 Id. at *7. 
 107 Id. (citing Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)). 
 108 Id. (quoting Harris, 908 A.2d at 209). 
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Thus, given the evolution of the societal landscape, the Murphy 
court found that it “appears unlikely that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court would legitimize discrimination against gays and lesbians by 
concluding that referring to someone as homosexual ‘tends so to 
harm the reputation of that person as to lower him in the estimation 
of the community as to deter third persons from associating or 
dealing with him.’”109  Consequently, the court denied Murphy’s 
defamation claim as a matter of law, holding that statements 
implying he was homosexual were not defamatory at all.110 
III. NORMATIVITY AND DEFAMATORY MEANING 
The future viability of defamation suits based on imputations 
of homosexuality is still uncertain.  Although there appear to be 
fewer recent decisions willing to place an allegation of 
homosexuality within the “criminal” or “unchastity” categories of 
per se defamation, plaintiffs are not barred from trying to establish 
claims with a showing of special damages.  More courts seem to be 
taking judicial notice of changing social attitudes toward 
alternative sexualities, although only a handful have entirely 
repudiated the notion that calling someone gay defames that 
individual.111 
Social attitudes are of course changing.  A number of polls 
have documented the increasing public acceptance of gay lifestyles 
and gay rights.  For example, a 2007 Gallup poll found “public 
tolerance for gay rights at the high-water mark of attitudes 
recorded over the past three decades.”112  Although the poll still 
found considerable opposition to gay marriage, on the issue of 
whether homosexuality was an acceptable lifestyle, 57% of 
respondents said they believed it was, which Gallup described as 
 
 109 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (“A communication is 
defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the 
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with 
him.”)). 
 110 Id. at *7–8. 
 111 See Part II. 
 112 Lydia Saad, Tolerance for Gay Rights at High-Water Mark, GALLUP (May 29, 
2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/27694/tolerance-gay-rights-highwater-mark.aspx. 
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“the highest on record for this measure.”113  A 2006 poll by the 
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press similarly found 
declines in the number of Americans opposing gay marriage, gay 
adoption, and open military service by gays.114  A 2009 Gallup poll 
also found a shift, even among conservatives, toward favoring 
openly gay service members: “The findings show that majorities of 
weekly churchgoers (60%), conservatives (58%), and Republicans 
(58%),” favored the end of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law,115  
which was repealed by Congress and signed by President Obama 
in December 2010.116  All of this empirical evidence strongly 
suggests that public attitudes are evolving. 
Given the data and the recent caselaw, one might surmise that 
defamation doctrine is in the gradual process of responding 
appropriately to social changes.  Defamation is, after all, the 
“social tort,” and the proper scope of defamatory meaning must 
move with changes in social attitudes.  But is the doctrinal change, 
slow though it may be, truly sufficient? 
This Article proposes a different and more comprehensive 
solution.  Regardless of the shifting winds of public sentiment, this 
Article suggests that courts should reject the conclusion that 
imputations of homosexuality are defamatory.  They should do so 
on the same grounds as the racial misidentification cases: public 
policy should not permit the law to symbolically endorse 
discriminatory attitudes or conduct, even if such attitudes are 
common. 
Our proposal suggests that common-law defamation doctrine 
should be fundamentally rethought to reflect the more egalitarian 
age of today and the courts’ more enlightened views on 
homosexuality in other legal contexts.  Indeed, this proposal would 
 
 113 Id. 
 114 Less Opposition to Gay Marriage, Adoption and Military Service, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (May 22, 2006), http://people-
press.org/report/273/less-opposition-to-gay-marriage-adoption-and-military-service. 
 115 Lymari Morales, Conservatives Shift in Favor of Openly Gay Service Members, 
GALLUP (June 5, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/120764/conservatives-shift-favor-
openly-gay-service-members.aspx. 
 116 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321 (2010) (repealing 
10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006)). 
C02_BUNKER_20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:41 PM 
2011] IMPUTATIONS OF HOMOSEXUALITY  603 
affect cases involving imputations of homosexuality, but it would 
also have implications for other defamation cases where unjustly 
discriminatory views are at issue.  This Article proposes that courts 
draw a sharp distinction between defamatory statements that refer 
to some immutable characteristic or involuntary status of an 
individual versus those statements that refer to some voluntary 
misconduct or malfeasance.  Courts should hold that statements or 
inferences about immutable characteristic references are non-
defamatory as a matter of law, regardless of a judge’s or a jury’s 
sense of how the Restatement’s “substantial and respectable” 
group of so-called right-thinking citizens would view a statement.  
Thus, a statement that reflected discriminatory attitudes toward 
someone’s racial or ethnic background, sexual orientation, 
mental117 or physical illness or disability, or other immutable 
characteristic should not be treated as carrying defamatory 
meaning, even if, in fact, a significant segment of society would 
endorse such discriminatory views. 
The justification for this restructuring of doctrine starts with 
the recognition that the Anglo-American common law of 
defamation carries with it vestiges of a very different, less 
egalitarian society than we find ourselves in today.118  Small 
 
 117 For an interesting analysis of defamation and mental illness, see Karen M. Markin, 
Still Crazy After All These Years: The Enduring Defamatory Power of Mental Disorder, 
29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 155 (2005). 
 118 See, e.g., LAWRENCE MCNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 73–74 (2007).  
McNamara notes that in ecclesiastical courts in England, defamation was intertwined 
with social control: 
The control dimension of the law is reflected first in the benchmark 
standard of “good and serious men.”  It was by definition acceptable 
under the law to speak ill of a person who was not of good fame 
“among good and serious men.”  The meaning of the phrase “good 
and serious men” is never discussed in the literature or cases, but 
there is never any doubt expressed about what it might mean.  Those 
who were thought of as “of no account” or “not of good fame” 
included the “underclass [of the poor and lawbreakers] who would 
rendezvous in taverns and other gathering places.”  Exclusion served 
to maintain the social order.  Hanawalt notes that the processes of 
marginalization in medieval England “were as important in 
establishing boundaries as were those that elevated and enclosed the 
space around the elite.”  Social control and exclusion are based on the 
equating of social standing and moral goodness; that is, power 
defines virtue. 
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wonder, then, that the mechanisms for determining harm to 
reputation are deficient—they evolved without a nuanced grasp of 
social discrimination and its harms.  Defamation doctrine’s origin 
precedes our current, more sophisticated understanding of how we 
should make social evaluations of persons.  The fact that the 
common law has perpetuated these atavistic understandings is not 
sound reason to follow those rules, stare decisis notwithstanding.  
As Justice Holmes put it,  
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of 
law than that so it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if the grounds 
upon which it was laid down have vanished long 
since, and the rule simply persists from blind 
imitation of the past.119 
The common law of defamation has assumed social inequality 
built into its very DNA—the assumption that certain people, by 
their very essence, are either superior or inferior.  People’s inherent 
characteristics were, in the not-so-distant past, a marker for their 
place in the social hierarchy—the prejudices of the “culturally 
superior” class are inevitably reflected in legal doctrine touching 
upon personal reputation.120  Only through a fundamental 
restructuring of how we think about defamatory meaning can we 
expunge this atavistic worldview from our legal doctrine.  The 
groundwork of such a restructuring was laid in Hayes v. Smith,121 
discussed earlier,122 which recognized the unfairness of placing 
imputations of homosexuality into the same (per se) category as “a 
person falsely accused of belonging to a category of persons 
considered deserving of social [condemnation], i.e., thief, 
murderer, prostitute, etc. . . . A Court should not classify 
homosexuals with those miscreants who have engaged in actions 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 119 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 120 See, e.g., Wolfe v. Georgia R. & E. Co., 58 S.E. 899, 901 (Ga. App. 1907) (“It is a 
matter of common knowledge, that, viewed from a social standpoint, the negro race is in 
mind and moral inferior to the Caucasian.  The record of each from the dawn of historic 
time denies equality.”). 
 121 Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022 (Colo. App. 1991). 
 122 See supra Part I.D.  
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that deserve . . . reprobation or scorn . . . .”123  Hayes, of course, 
only addressed whether imputations of homosexuality should be 
categorized as defamatory per se—our suggestion is that 
imputations involving immutable characteristics or involuntary 
status should not be recognized as carrying any defamatory 
meaning whatsoever.124 
Commentators have long recognized this fundamental flaw in 
the law’s evaluation of defamatory meaning, although most appear 
to have simply accepted the status quo.  Consider, for example, 
Dean Prosser’s statement that “[a] defamatory communication 
usually has been defined as one which tends to hold the plaintiff up 
to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or 
avoided.  This definition is certainly too narrow, since an 
imputation of insanity, or poverty, or an assertion that a woman 
has been raped, which would be likely to arouse only pity or 
sympathy in the minds of all decent people, have been held to be 
defamatory.”125  Our contention is that, regardless of how decent 
people would react, these are exactly the kinds of statements that 
the law, as a matter of policy, should not recognize as carrying any 
defamatory meaning.  They are statements that refer not to some 
voluntary wrong-doing or illegal course of conduct, but to an 
individual’s unavoidable—and sometimes unfortunate—status.  
The problem is not simply that, as Prosser put it, the standard 
definition of a defamatory communication is “too narrow.”126  The 
problem is that the standard definition recognizes as defamatory 
statements that stigmatize innocent classes of persons and thus 
perpetuate and approve that stigma. 
Within certain narrow domains, such as racial 
misidentification, courts have recognized the problem as well.  
Consider Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court,127 a 1985 
California appellate decision.  In Polygram, comedian Robin 
Williams and several media companies were sued for defamation 
by a wine maker after Williams recorded a joke which, the maker 
 
 123 Hayes, 832 P.2d at 1025. 
 124 See supra Part I.D. 
 125 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 739 (4th ed. 1971) (citations omitted). 
 126 Id. 
 127 216 Cal. Rptr. 252 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
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contended, associated its wine with African-Americans.128  
Williams’ routine focused on a “Black” wine, “Rege” (or 
“Reggie”) that unlike red or white wine, “goes with fish, meat, any 
damn thing it wants to.”129  Apparently unbeknownst to Williams, 
there was an actual “Rege” wine company, which filed suit.130  As 
part of its defamation claim, Rege argued that the comedy routine 
associated its wine with African-Americans, “allegedly ‘a socio-
economic group of persons commonly considered to be the 
antithesis of wine connoisseurs,’ who ‘harbor obviously 
unsophisticated tastes in wines.’”131 
The California court rejected this argument as “utterly 
untenable.”132  Even assuming the joke conveyed that sentiment, 
the court wrote, “he could not recover damages based upon a 
theory that his wine had been disparaged by association with a 
particular racial or ethnic group, or a segment thereof.  Courts will 
not condone theories of recovery which promote or effectuate 
discriminatory conduct.”133  The California court cited Palmore v. 
Sidoti,134 in which the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a Florida 
decision denying custody of a three-year-old to her mother because 
the mother had remarried an African-American man and the 
mixed-race marriage would cause social stigma to be visited upon 
the child.135  The Court, noting that a denial of custody was clearly 
state action subject to the Equal Protection Clause, ruled that 
judges could not, under the Constitution, consider such alleged 
stigma in a custody case.136  “Private biases may be outside the 
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give 
them effect,” the Court wrote137 in a sentence later quoted in the 
 
 128 Id. at 254. 
129  Id. 
 130 Id. at 253.  
 131 Id. at 261. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id.  
 134 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 135 Id. at 433. 
 136 Id. at 433–34. 
 137 Id. at 433. 
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Albright case, which itself found that defamation per se “demeans 
the lives of homosexual persons.”138 
Although Polygram Records does not explicitly anticipate the 
breadth of our proposal, the California court’s reasoning is 
certainly consistent with the direction in which we would like to 
see the law go.  Whether or not a determination of defamatory 
meaning is state action implicating the Equal Protection Clause,139 
as the Polygram case seemed to suggest, defamation doctrine 
would benefit from a deeper consideration of the equality effects of 
its rules.  The issue of defamatory meaning is in most jurisdictions 
based in the common law, which regularly consults public policy 
implications in shaping doctrine.  The Restatement’s reference to 
anti-social groups, whose views courts should reject,140 implicitly 
endorses this role of public policy in shaping the normative 
boundaries of defamatory meaning, although the law has yet to 
come to grips with the full implications of the problem.141 
The argument that important social goals should at times 
outweigh legitimate reputational harm is consistent, of course, with 
numerous public policy-based defenses already recognized in libel 
doctrine.  Various privileges, for example, allow defamation to 
take place in light of important reasons supporting the privilege.  
Absolute privileges against defamation liability granted to judges, 
legislators, and executive officials,142 for example, protect the 
important social interest of these officials carrying out their official 
duties without fear of ruinous defamation suits.143  Various 
qualified privileges for speaking in the public interest—including a 
 
 138 Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 137 (D. Mass. 2004) (quoting Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003)).  Justice Scalia, however, appears to disagree.  In his 
vigorous dissent to Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), a case in which the Supreme 
Court overturned a Colorado referendum denying equal protection to homosexuals, he 
cited pre-Lawrence precedent and argued that “[i]f it is constitutionally permissible for a 
State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a 
State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct.” Id. at 641.   
 139 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977). 
 141 See Lidsky, supra note 14, at 9 (arguing that public policy choices obscured by 
defamation doctrine should be addressed explicitly by courts). 
 142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585, 590–91 (1977).  
 143 SACK, supra note 6, § 2.8.2. 
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privilege granted to the press144—similarly recognize the principle 
that compensating defamatory harms must sometimes give way to 
important policy considerations. 
Our proposal is also consistent with the constitutional 
revolution in libel law begun by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.145  
Prior to Sullivan, most courts had essentially ignored the harm to 
First Amendment interests that state-driven libel doctrine had 
created.146  Sullivan and its progeny recognized that free speech 
interests sometimes must be vindicated even in the face of real 
reputational harms.  The “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open”147 simply trumps the reputational interests of 
certain classes of libel plaintiffs.  In the same way, our proposal 
suggests that equality interests must at times trump even genuine 
defamatory harms when the statements giving rise to liability 
compel the law to give its approval to discriminatory and unjustly 
stigmatizing social views. 
There are of course interests that counsel against this shift in 
doctrine.  Particularly in more socially conservative areas of the 
country, individuals may in fact suffer reputational harm because 
of imputations of homosexuality or other immutable 
characteristics.  Social relationships may be damaged; careers may 
be affected.  Not only that, but, as Professor Lidsky points out, “it 
rewards the defamer by giving him license to defame again.”148  
There are no easy answers, yet there are powerful reasons to 
consider change in the legal status quo. 
The imprimatur of the law is a powerful symbolic force that 
normalizes certain social understandings.149  Basing legal decisions 
on discriminatory beliefs and behaviors, whether in libel law or 
child custody cases, validates those beliefs and behaviors.  There 
 
 144 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 594 (1977). 
 145 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 146 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s 
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 26–27 (2002). 
 147 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270. 
 148 Lidsky, supra note 14, at 23. 
 149 See id. at 40 (arguing that “defamation’s symbolic functions often take precedence 
over its instrumental ones”). 
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must come a time when the law no longer recognizes atavistic and 
discriminatory social views as indispensible ingredients in legal 
doctrine.150  That time, we believe, is now. 
CONCLUSION 
Imputation of homosexuality cases present an interesting 
challenge for courts as social understandings of gay individuals 
evolve.  A status that was once regarded as criminal in nature has 
come to mean something quite different to many citizens in the 
early part of the twenty-first century.  The process by which courts 
account for such changes in social attitudes is an important aspect 
of the study of defamation law.  Although the law appears to be in 
a state of flux, this Article has suggested that courts should 
seriously consider whether to give legal effect to discriminatory 
views in a way that legitimizes and validates them. 
Our proposal suggests that courts decline to recognize as 
defamatory statements that stigmatize a class of persons based on 
some immutable characteristic or involuntary status.  As one court 
put it, courts should not “condone theories of recovery which 
promote or effectuate discriminatory conduct.”151  Although this 
proposal has definite costs, it has the decided advantage of 
removing the imprimatur of the law from regressive and 
stigmatizing social attitudes. 
 
 
 150 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) which had upheld racial segregation as constitutional). 
 151 Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252, 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985). 
